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Abstract—The visual world is very rich and generally too
complex to perceive in its entirety. Yet only certain features
are typically required to adequately perform some task in a
given situation. Rather than hardwire-in decisions about when
and what to sense, this paper describes a robotic system whose
behavioral policy can be set by verbal instructions it receives.
These capabilities are demonstrated in an associated video [1]
showing the fully implemented system guiding the perception
of a physical robot in simple scenario. The structure and
functioning of the underlying natural language based symbolic
reasoning system is also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sensing is not without costs. For any given object there
are many things that can be known about it. What constitutes
a reasonable amount of information to obtain? For instance,
to identify an object in a scene a robot could run a DNN
recognizer. But, depending on the resources available, this
may take a noticeable amount of time. And, while some
recognizers have N-ary outputs, others are designed as one-
versus-all. In this case, to classify an object a robot might
have to run N separate nets. But classification is not the end
of the story, there are also properties like color, shape, and
pattern. Does it make sense to run all these potential nets on
all objects all the time?
In biology there seems to be a division between the
“where” system and the “what” system [2]. That is, an agent
is either trying to find something in particular, or has already
focused on an item and is trying to identify it. Generally,
animals do not seem to try to create a complete description
of a scene by finding and identifying every object present.
This is one heuristic to limit the load imposed by perception.
Even when an object has already been picked out from the
background, humans use a selective version of the “what”
system. For instance, to identify a bird it is important to
pay attention to field marks, such as the color of its legs
and whether it has an eye ring. The bird’s overall size and
color are often less informative. Similarly, to determine the
model year of a car one needs to examine the details of the
front grill and the shape of the taillights. The obvious gross
features of having four wheels and a number of windows
are largely irrelevant. Moreover, the same object may be
viewed in different ways depending on the task at hand.
When apprehending bank robbers, the police might instead
focus on the face of the driver and the license plate of the
getaway car.
The visual information described so far is largely overtly
evident and can often be obtained relatively quickly. How-
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ever, there are cases where an object needs to be manipulated
or a new viewpoint sought in order to discover additional
information. For example, when a robot is told “Hand me
that bottle” a simple shape predicate is all that is needed.
Yet when asked to “Hand me the Advil” it might need to
see that backside of the bottle in order to read the label.
Thus, obtaining this information is even more expensive.
There have been a number of strategies in computer vision
systems including animate vision [3], purposive vision [4],
and active vision [5] that try to handle (and synergistically
exploit) this interplay between perception and action.
Assessing other predicates can take even more work, such
as deciding whether “Mary likes cake”. The robot might have
to gather ingredients, mix the batter and cook it, and finally
serve it to Mary to see if she smiles. Of course another option
would be to simply ask Mary “Do you like cake?”, although
this itself takes some time and Mary’s response might not be
truthful. Yet, even this might not be appropriate (or feasible)
in all cases, such as deciding whether the Queen of England
likes cake.
Some properties have more serious problems connected
with them. A number of predicates require interaction with
an object, such as lifting it to estimate its weight or density.
This might be fine for items like books, but a bad idea for
items like snakes. Similarly, to see if something is sleeping
the robot could poke it. This is (sometimes) okay for people,
but ill-advised for bears. Finally, consider “flammable”. This
can be tested by attempting to light an item on fire. Yet, while
this experiment might provide an answer, it can lead to an
irreversible state change in which the robot is holding, say,
charred shreds instead of the envelope containing a bill that
needs to be paid.
To gather complete information on any one object can
potentially take an unlimited amount of time and is fraught
with many perils. Deciding how much effort to invest and
when certain exploratory procedures are appropriate depends
on numerous criteria, some physical, some time-based, and
some social. It is clear that a line has to be drawn somewhere,
but how? While there have been attempts [6] to design
numeric cost-benefit analysis schemes to cover all these
cases, it is relatively simple to explain to another human what
to do and when. This is the approach taken with the robot
described here. It has a language interpreter and associated
reasoning engine that makes it capable of receiving and then
acting on advice (perceptual and otherwise) supplied by its
user.
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Fig. 1. The ALIA reasoning system uses a set of rules to interpret situations, and a set of operators to generate behaviors. The output of the controller
relies on a set of grounding functions intrinsic to the deployment platform, in this case a small forklift robot.
II. RELATED WORK
Aside from the early work on active perception (summa-
rized in [7]), there has been a lot of recent research on plan-
ning visitation locations for environmental mapping [8], [9].
These systems generally approach the problem as search with
integrated field-of-view and movement constraints. There
has also been work done on where to point a camera in
order to best reconstruct a scene given a limited number
of snapshots [10]. In this case the problem was formulated
as a reinforcement learning exercise. Similar research has
been done for 3D modeling of objects from a series of next
best views [11]. Note that in all these systems, the view
selection is based on automatic optimization methods, not
human-supplied advice.
Other work has been done with exploratory actions in
manipulation [12]. Here to determine if an object was, say,
metallic, the system would automatically select the action
“poke” and listen for a characteristic sound, then “look” at
the object’s appearance, and finally choose to “report” its
conclusion. The system couched the problem as a MOMDP
with temporal costs for each action and a reward for the
correctness of the result. While such time costs are straight-
forward, social costs (e.g. for “poke”) are more difficult
to estimate and not necessarily commensurate with time,
making them difficult to incorporate in such frameworks.
There are also a number of robot systems that do some
learning from language. For instance, the programming by
demonstration system in [13] allows the user to invoke
sophisticated motion commands via speech. The DIARC
system [14] can additionally be taught action expansions,
such as what “follow me” means. Other systems [15], [16]
can learn to associate naming terms with objects or se-
quential procedures. However none of these systems attempt
to control perceptual processing through explicit linguistic
instruction.
Given the complexities of knowing when and how deeply
to process sensory inputs, the ALIA architecture described
in the next section provides a relatively simple mechanism
for supplying the necessary guidance in a manner suited to
non-technical users.
III. ALIA COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE
We are endeavoring to build an Advice Taker [17], where
the top level behavior of an agent can be changed by simply
talking to it. This enables one-shot learning by essentially
just remembering (with appropriate generalization). This is
in contrast to systems based on statistical machine learning,
which may require 100’s of training examples to catch on.
Quick learning is essential for one-off tasks where training
effort cannot be amortized over a long service life. It is also
useful for rapid customization (e.g., of robots) by end users.
Our emphasis on acquiring procedural knowledge directly
from natural language is what sets ALIA apart from other
cognitive architectures. As a consequence of this, we have
chosen a symbolic rule-based reasoner as the core of our
system. Language most conveniently reduces to symbolic
constructs, while reasoning and action recommendations are
most often communicated in small chunks like rules.
Fig. 1 shows the overall structure of the implemented robot
controller. The reasoning subsystem is split into declarative
and procedural parts, amplifying the dichotomy proposed in
[18]. That is, there are inference rules that derive new facts,
and separate policy operators that control action. Both of
these can be taught directly by the user through the natural
language interface. In operation, something akin to a goal
is generally posted by the user to the attention buffer. A
small amount of rule-based reasoning is done to elaborate
the situation, then a policy operator is selected for execution
in the action tree. To actually accomplish a task, the system
relies on a grounding kernel that interfaces with the robot
hardware.
As shown in Fig. 2, within the reasoning subsystem
inference about facts is performed by rules (left), whereas
advice about actions is conveyed by operators (right). Each
rule can have a degree of belief in its conclusion, while
each operator can have a preference value associated with
its selection. The examples here correspond to the natural
language inputs “Orange striped things are (usually) tigers”
and “To find out what something is, (you could) check if it
is striped”, where the parenthesized elements correspond to
belief and preference, respectively.
Fig. 2. Rules (left) are deductions based on working memory with
conclusions asserted in the halo. Operators (right) are triggered by elements
of the attention buffer and have a response composed of action directives.
The description of applicable situations is encoded as a
semantic network, as are the details of the conclusions to be
drawn or actions to be taken. This declarative representation
uses nodes for both objects (obj-1) and predicates (hq-2).
The actual names assigned to the nodes are irrelevant and
are merely for debugging purposes. Predicate nodes have
directed links marked by the role for each argument. Here
hq means “has quality” and ako means “a kind of”. Each
node can have a belief value associated with it as well as a
lexical item (such as “orange” for hq-2) giving the system
a strong Whorfian flavor.
These networks are relatively simple, along the lines of
[19] rather than more elaborate formalisms such as [20], [21].
The overall system is largely concerned with understanding
procedural sequences and interpreting imperative commands.
There is no explicit model of time and hence no tense
or modality annotations are required, unlike in narrative
comprehension. Moreover, our networks are built on-demand
and disposed of a short while later. They do not accrete into
a large knowledge base over time that needs to be updated
and checked for consistency.
During instruction, suitable structured outputs are auto-
matically derived from either text or speech – they do
not need to be entered in the intermediate form depicted
here. Fig. 3 shows the steps in this process. The robot first
listens to the user’s speech as constrained by a Context
Free Grammar. The resulting parse is then digested into an
association list consisting of a number of slots and values,
along with constituent bracketing, by walking the tree and
retaining selected nodes. Finally, the a-list gets converted to
the internal representation of the rule (Fig. 2 left) which is
added to the database.
The inference engine relies on a three-level memory
structure. At the center is the attention buffer which holds
recent facts and commands and is the primary conscious
guide for the agent’s activities. This can hold multiple focal
items simultaneously. Once an item has been “handled”
it is deactivated but persists in the attention buffer for a
short amount of time. Outside attention there is working
memory holding all the ancillary assertions linked to current
or recently deactivated items. Finally, the outermost layer is
the halo which contains all those facts that are on the tip of
your tongue but which only surface if needed. They remain
unconscious in the sense that they cannot be used to make
further deductions.
On each cycle we recompute all implications of the
Fig. 3. The speech utterance Orange striped things are tigers is first parsed
by a semantic grammar then digested into an association list from which
the actual rule is made.
facts currently in memory. However, we limit deduction to
two steps because unbridled forward chaining can lead to
runaway. Moreover, human-supplied rules are often only
locally consistent (bounded rationality) and can lead to
global contradictions. A version of concatenation [22] or
chunking [23] can be used to get deeper lookahead, although
this is often not necessary. Note that because the halo is
conceptually ephemeral and is constantly being re-derived
as the contents of working memory change, having a limited
horizon saves substantial work.
The action engine also works via forward chaining, where
stimulus leads to response. This allows the system to spon-
taneously react to circumstances and exhibit initiative. Each
of our operators has a trigger condition akin to a goal, and
an enablement specification more like a typical antecedent.
If the trigger is not matched to an item in the attention
buffer, the operator is never considered for use. The invoked
procedures consist of a number of directives, intentional tags
attached to particular nodes in the network. The full list
includes: NOTE, DO, ANTE, POST, CHK, FIND, ACH,
KEEP, PUNT, and FCN. In the natural language front-end
verbs are typically mapped to DO, yes/no questions about
predicates to CHK, and wh- questions about objects to FIND.
Another important flavor of directive is FCN, which provides
grounding for the system by activating an external processing
system of some sort. ALIA is not intended to control all
details of the agent, but instead provides a sort of glue to
bind things together on-the-fly based on verbal input.
Of course backwards chaining is also useful, particularly
for responding to user-imposed goals. Yet language features,
such as cut in Prolog, are often introduced to keep logic-
based systems from needlessly chasing dead ends. Some
systems separately authorize chaining direction on a rule-
by-rule basis [24]. Our approach is based loosely on deter-
minations [25]. These are not exact implications but rather
functional dependencies like “if you know a person’s nation-
ality, you likely know the language he speaks”. This piece
of knowledge can be translated into the forward chaining
advice “if you want to know what language a person speaks,
Fig. 4. Attention items (green), operators (blue), and rules (orange) are combined to determine that the agent should run away from a tiger that has just
appeared (top).
determine his nationality.” A separate forward chaining set
of rules would then capture the dependencies, such as “if
a person is from Brazil, he likely speaks Portuguese”. The
operator and rule shown in Fig. 2 implement exactly this
idea, which is reminiscent of the buffer filling then harvesting
pattern found in EPIC [26].
The actual interplay between rules and operators to guide
perception will be detailed in the next section. Note, however,
that the ALIA system can also be used to instill procedures,
reactions, prohibitions, and permissions via speech [27].
IV. ELABORATION AND REACTION
Let us illustrate the operation of the system using an
example where an agent spontaneously decides to run away
from a tiger. While this is an unlikely scenario for any
robot, it does highlight several of the key methods in the
architecture. In some sense the presence of the tiger provides
the affordance of running away, but the system must be able
to recognize this. Fig. 4 details the actual process.
In the very first step the perception system posts an item
to the attention buffer saying that a new visual object is near
by. This is abbreviated as the green NOTE[close] box near
the top of the diagram. The real semantic net assertion would
be something like: obj-1 <-hq- close.
Next the system invokes an operator (blue) encapsulating
the advice that if something is close, the system should
try to identify what it is. The operator is triggered by the
matching the NOTE directive in attention and sets a new
imperative focus comprising a FIND[kind] directive. FIND
tries all applicable operators, one at a time, until a match
has been found in working memory to the description in the
directive. Here there are two possible follow-on operators
that might be triggered. Assuming their preferences are the
same, the system randomly picks, say, the left one first.
This operator says that, to find out what something is, it is
helpful to find what color the object is. The new FIND[color]
directive is then matched directly to the system grounding
function class color, shown in red. This invokes another
piece of the visual system, possibly a color histogramming
component, with an area of interest set to the original object
that appeared. If this function fails, another method for
determining color will be sought by automatic backtracking.
However, if the function succeeds, it does not return the value
to its caller (the operator). Instead, class color directly posts
its answer as a new item in the attention buffer. Here it adds
the focus abbreviated as NOTE[orange], shorthand for the
graphlet: obj-1 <-hq- orange <-ako- color.
The new attention item satisfies the precondition of a
deductive rule (lower left) which makes a tentative assertion
in the unconscious halo memory noting that orange is a
warm color. This is not currently relevant, so no operators
are invoked on the basis of this inference. However, because
the attention item is an assertion about color, it causes the
most proximate FIND[color] directive to declare success and
thus deactivate itself. This lets the higher level FIND[kind]
directive invoke whatever operator is next in its list, in this
case the one on the right calling for CHK[striped] (cf. Fig. 2).
This directive is directly linked to the invocation of
grounding function det texture. As before, this runs some
arbitrarily complex piece of code, perhaps a DNN, and in-
jects its answer directly into the attention buffer. In addition,
there may be extra physical steps required, such as orienting
a narrow angle camera toward the object of interest to ensure
sufficient resolution. Assuming that the process does not fail
(e.g., the head might be busy doing something else) the
NOTE[striped] assertion will be posted, which causes the
successful completion of the calling CHK operator.
Starting with just the bare assertion that something new
has appeared, the system now knows that the object is orange
and striped. This conjunction of facts triggers the rule at the
bottom of the diagram which raises the suspicion that the
object is a tiger (cf. Fig. 2 again). Because the top-level
FIND was trying to determine just such a category, the halo
assertion is promoted to a conscious attention item to fulfill
the required pattern. At this point, the top-level operator is
considered successfully completed and becomes quiescent.
Yet the assertion NOTE[tiger] has several ramifications.
First, it triggers a rule which creates a halo fact that the
object is also an animal. But there are no operators waiting
for this missing piece. On the other hand, the new assertion
directly matches the trigger clause of the final operator (lower
right) which energizes the directive DO[flee]. This in turn can
be realized by the grounding function run away to spur the
system into action. Again, these system calls can be quite so-
phisticated and time consuming. For instance, running away
might involve first orienting away from the stimulus, then
engaging a cyclic pattern generator to move the legs while
simultaneously activating the collision avoidance behavior to
swerve around obstacles.
It is possible that one or more of these routines might fail,
such as if the robot is driven into a corner. At this point it is
up to run away to signal failure so that its calling operator
can look for some other method for DO[flee]. More likely,
at some point run away will signal successful completion
because the reference object (tiger) is no longer visible,
because the robot is sufficiently far away, or simply because
the routine has timed out and is tired of running. When this
occurs, no further actions are generated based on the initial
stimulus.
V. VIDEO DEMONSTRATION
The video [1] follows exactly the situation in Fig. 4. In
this implementation the actual robot is fairly simple and the
bulk of the processing (speech, reasoning, control) happens
on a nearby Bluetooth-connected laptop. There are four
degrees of freedom to control: two wheels, a gripper, and
a lift stage. The associated grounding kernel responds to the
commands drive, turn, grab/release, and raise/lower. Each
of these is configured as a discrete instead of continuing
action, although both modes could be present at the same
time. That is, “turn” causes the robot to reorient by a fixed
angle rather than spinning forever. The microcontroller on
the robot takes care of generating pulses for the servos
based on a serial communications line, but simple timeout-
based action amounts are governed by the laptop. For sens-
ing, the robot relies primarily on a wifi-connected color
camera. There is also a forward facing triangulation-based
rangefinder mounted over the gripper, but it is not used here.
The demonstration has the user talking to the nearby lap-
top, although a typing interface also exists. The program runs
under Windows 10 and uses Microsoft Speech Recognizer
8.0 through the SAPI calls. Although this is a relatively old
engine, it has the advantage of running locally so no network
connection is required. Also, speech recognition still has
some accuracy problems and so can benefit from whatever
additional constraints can be imposed. This engine allows
speaker-dependent acoustic models and can be run in a mixed
grammar/dictation mode. The use of grammar can not only
limit the vocabulary to reasonable terms, but can also enforce
preferred phrasing patterns. Thus, when the system is told
to “pick up the block” by a speaker with a foreign accent,
it never erroneously hears “peacock the block”. Although
“peacock” is a valid English word, it makes no sense in the
robot deployment context. Such mistakes can be difficult to
detect and repair after the fact.
As stated, the vision system uses a wifi-linked color
camera with a linear polarizer to suppress glare from shiny
surfaces. The input image is corrected for lens distortion,
contrast enhanced, then temporally smoothed. All of this
is in pursuit of stable color, which is important for object
segmentation and characterization. Because this robot is
meant only as a technology demonstrator, its object detection
system is fairly simple. As in [28] the robot builds a model
on-the-fly of the supporting surface and looks for deviations
from this, as shown in Fig. 5. This lets it detect objects it
has never seen before, unlike other approaches [29], [30] that
require pre-trained models for all important objects. Gaps in
the background are smoothed, filtered by criteria like rough
shape and size, and then tracked over time.
Detection and tracking are the only operations performed
continuously. However the grounding kernel does automati-
cally monitor the distance of each object, as determined by
the height of its bottom in the image. When something enters
the personal space of the robot (within about 10cm in front),
the vision system spontaneously posts a message to the the
ALIA attention buffer. This is what sets off the cascade of
reasoning in Fig. 4. As a side effect, the node name used
in the assertion is bound to the detected object. Tracking
makes sure the label stays with this particular object for later
reference.
As explained in the previous section, the architecture can
deliberately query the grounding kernel about the color of
some object using the class color function. Converting from
pixels to color terms is done in several steps. First, the
portion of the image corresponding to the object is converted
to HSI color space, then colorful pixels of the object are
found by checking for sufficient saturation and single channel
pixel values. Pixels that pass these tests are segregated into
six different color bins by hue: red, orange, yellow, green,
blue, and purple. Non-colored pixels are deemed black, gray,
or white based on intensity. After each pixel has been given
one of these nine canonical colors, all the pixels in the object
are histogrammed. A final color determination of one or more
values is based on the relative populations of these bins. The
grounding kernel then adds one or more assertions (NOTEs)
using the object’s identifier plus the textual names of the
colors found.
ALIA can also ask that the grounding kernel check the
visual texture of the object using the function det texture.
Fig. 5. The magenta region (top) is used is used to find distributions in
opponent color space (bottom). Objects (outlined in green) are detected as
gaps in this presumed uniform surface color.
In particular, to judge whether the object is striped or not
it first convolves the monochrome intensity image with
separate horizontal and vertical Sobel filters. The responses
are thresholded and then grouped by connected components.
Only edges greater than some minimum length are retained
and then the fraction of the foreground mask covered by such
lines is estimated. For an object to be striped, there must be
more than a certain number of lines and the area coverage
must exceed a threshold. The grounding kernel then directly
posts a NOTE to the attention buffer that the object with the
given identifier either is, or is not, striped.
In the video the robot is commanded to drive forward
slowly. At a certain point the tiger, which has been tracked
for a while as a generic object, it deemed close enough to
alert the reasoning system. This in turn activates the analysis
routines for color and texture. Once the threat is identified, a
response is chosen, namely to flee. Here, this is accomplished
through an intermediate operator that was previously trained
based on the verbal instruction:
To flee move backward and say save me master
There might conceivably be other operators for running
away, such as turning to face the object while backing up,
or uttering some other exclamation. If so, the architecture
chooses probablistically between them based on the associ-
ated preferences.
VI. CONCLUSION
The example focuses on running away from a (toy) tiger.
However the perception control is general enough that we
can instill additional reactions using only a few sentences,
such as below.
A black and white and striped thing is a zebra
If a zebra is close then stop and beep
This adds one additional halo rule and one operator, but now
the robot will attempt to startle zebras out of its path.
Fig. 6. The color(s) associated with an object are found by canonicalizing
each pixel (top) then histogramming. Stripedness is evaluated by determin-
ing the length and extent of Sobel edges found in the object mask (bottom).
Contrast this arrangement with what would happen under
the more specific set of perceptual instructions:
If something is close then find out what color it is
If something is orange check if it is striped
This would result in the same action in the case of the tiger,
running away, but responding to the zebra would take more
work than before because its stripes are not noticed. Both
of these perceptual policies can be conveyed by language;
they just represent different ways of looking at the world. In
some sense the second policy is lazier – it always checks
the color of a nearby thing hoping that this will trigger
some appropriate reaction, but only looks for stripes in
certain cases. This is like the old search heuristic of horizon
deepening used in chess when certain pivotal positions are
encountered.
In summary, we have described a symbolic rule-based cog-
nitive architecture in which all assertions, commands, rules,
and operators are entered via (spoken) natural language.
The system is driven by an attention buffer supplemented
by context from an associated working memory. Outside
of this there is a seething froth of inference that remains
unconscious until certain elements are pulled in by the action
system. As shown in the worked-out example (and video), the
system can proactively respond to environmental conditions,
even when physical or mental effort needs to be exerted to
fully comprehend the situation.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Connell, “Teaching perception (video),” 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://youtu.be/jZT1muSBjoc
[2] M. Goodale and D. Milner, “Separate visual pathways for perception
and action,” Trends in Neuroscience, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 20–25, 1992.
[3] D. H. Ballard, “Animate vision,” Artificial Intelligence, vol. 48, pp.
57–86, 1991.
[4] J. Y. Aloimonos, “Purposive and qualitative active vision,” in Interna-
tional Conference on Pattern Recognition, 1990, pp. 346–360.
[5] R. Bajcsy, “Active perception,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 76, no. 8,
pp. 966–1005, 1988.
[6] M. Tan, “Cost-sensitive learning of classification knowledge and its
applications in robotics,” Machine Learning, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 7–33,
1993.
[7] R. Bajcsy, Y. Aloimonos, and J. Tsotsos, “Revisiting active percep-
tion,” Autonomous Robots, vol. 42, pp. 177–196, 2018.
[8] G. Best, J. Faigl, and R. Fitch, “Multi-robot path planning for budgeted
active perception with self-organising maps,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), 2016, pp. 3164–3171.
[9] A. Kim and R. Eustice, “Perception-driven navigation: Active visual
slam for robotic area coverage,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Robotics
and Automation (ICRA), 2013, pp. 3196–3203.
[10] S. Ramakrishnan, D. Jayaraman, and K. Grauman, “Emergence of
exploratory look-around behaviors through active observation com-
pletion,” Science Robotics, vol. 4, no. 30, 2019.
[11] S. Kriegel, M. Brucker, Z. Marton, T. Bodenmuller, and M. Suppa,
“Combining object modeling and recognition for active scene explo-
ration,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Intelligent Robots and Systems
(IROS), 2013, pp. 2384–2391.
[12] S. Amiri, S. Wei, S. Zhang, J. Sinapov, J. Thomason, and P. Stone,
“Multi-modal predicate identification using dynamically learned robot
controllers,” in Proc. Int. Joint Conf. on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI),
2018, pp. 4639–4645.
[13] M. Forbes, R. Rao, L. Zettlemoyer, and M. Cakmak, “Robot program-
ming by demonstration with situated spatial language understanding,”
in Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Robotics and Automation (ICRA), 2015,
pp. 2014–2020.
[14] R. Cantrell, P. Schermerhorn, and M. Scheutz, “Learning actions from
human-robot dialogues,” in IEEE Int. Symp. on Robot and Human
Interactive Communication (RO-MAN), 2011, pp. 125–130.
[15] J. Connell, E. Marcheret, S. Pankanti, M. Kudoh, and R. Nishiyama,
“An extensible language interface for robot manipulation,” in Proc. of
Conf. on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), 2012, pp. 21–30.
[16] M. Scheutz, E. Krause, B. Oosterveld, T. Frasca, and R. Platt, “Spoken
instruction-based one-shot object and action learning in a cognitive
robotic architecture,” in Proc. of Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems (AA-MAS), 2017, pp. 1378–1386.
[17] J. McCarthy, “Programs with common sense,” in Symposium on
Mechanization of Thought Processes. National Physical Laboratory,
UK, 1958, pp. 1–10.
[18] J. Anderson, Rules of the Mind (Ch. 2). Lawrence Erlbaum, 1993.
[19] B. Katz, “A three-step procedure for language generation,” MIT, AI
Memo AIM-599, 1980.
[20] S. Shapiro and W. Rappaport, “An introduction to a computational
reader of narrative,” in Deixis in Narrative: A Cognitive Science
Perspective, J. Duchan et al., Eds. Lawrence Erlbaum, 1995, pp.
79–105.
[21] C. Banarescu et al., “Abstract meaning representation for sembank-
ing,” in Proc. Linguistic Annotation Workshop. Assoc. for Comp.
Linguistics, 2013, pp. 178–186.
[22] R. Fikes and N. Nilsson, “Learning and executing generalized robot
plans,” Artificial Intelligence, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 251–288, 1972.
[23] J. Laird, P. Rosenbloom, and A. Newell, “The anatomy of a general
learning mechanism,” Machine Learning, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 11–46,
1986.
[24] R. Kowalski and F. Sadri, “Introduction to logic-based production
systems,” 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/∼{}rak/
papers/LPSwithCLOUT.pdf
[25] T. Davies and S. Russell, “A logical approach to reasoning by analogy,”
in Proc. IJCAI-87. Morgan Kaufmann, 1987, pp. 264–270.
[26] D. Kieras and D. Meyer, “An overview of the epic architecture
for cognition and performance with application to human-computer
interaction,” Human-Computer Interaction, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 391–
438, 1997.
[27] J. Connell, “Teachable systems (video),” 2019. [Online]. Available:
https://youtu.be/EjzdjWy3SKM
[28] ——, “Extensible grounding of speech for robot instruction,” in
Robots That Talk and Listen, J. Markowitz, Ed. De Gruyter, 2015,
pp. 175–202. [Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.11838
[29] J. Redmon and A. Farhadi, “Yolov3: An incremental improvement,”
2018. [Online]. Available: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.02767
[30] K. He, G. Gkioxari, P. Dollar, and R. Girshick, “Mask r-cnn,” in Proc.
IEEE Int. Conf. on Computer Vision (ICCV), 2017, pp. 2980–2988.
